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In this paper I explore the deeper relation between the elements of freedom and unpredictability of the human will and action, claiming that for the former to exist, the latter should exist too. Firstly, I deal with the 
doctrine of ‘Philosophical Necessity’ as discussed by John Stuart Mill in the 
case of human will and action and I attempt to prove that certain objections 
can be raised on whether this doctrine can be applied on all human volitions 
and actions. Secondly, I suggest that there is a specific kind of human will and 
action that the doctrine cannot be applied to and I provide a number of relevant 
examples. I then argue for a view, which aspires to present a more substantially 
free conception of free will and action than the ones presented by the prominent 
conceptions, due to the fact that it cannot, by any means, be predicted, since its 
formulation is an outcome of a process of genuine creativity. 
What Makes Free Will Free:
The Impossibility of Predicting Genuine 
Creativity
Abstract
In this paper I argue that Mill’s ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ regarding the human 
will and action cannot apply on all cases, and that the human mind has potentially the 
capacity to create freely a will or action that, no matter what kind of knowledge we 
possess, cannot be predicted. More precisely, I argue against Mill’s attempt of conjunction 
between the freedom of the will and the ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ while I 
attempt a comparison with the relevant Kantian approach. I then claim that a will 
cannot be free and be predicted at the same time, as both the elements of freedom 
and unpredictability of the will are founded on the very process of its formulation as an 
outcome of genuine creativity. I, thus, attempt to propose a more substantially free view 
of free will and action than the ones presented by the prominent conceptions.
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To begin with, I shall concentrate my attention on Mill’s chapter “Of 
Liberty and Necessity” in his work A  System of Logic, Ratiocinative and 
Inductive (1843).1 From the first lines of the chapter, Mill presents the 
question that he wants to explore and states the two opposing opinions. The 
question focuses on whether the law of causality applies as strictly to human 
actions as to other phenomena; that is to say natural phenomena. There are 
two opinions regarding the possible answer to this question. On the one 
hand, there is the positive opinion, which is formed by the Necessitarians and 
suggests that human volition and action are necessary and irrevocable. On 
the other hand, there is the negative one, which implies that human volition 
and action is not determined by any causes, but rather it is self-determined. 
Mill does not hesitate to take a clear position by adopting the affirmative 
position, that is to say the ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity,’2 of which the 
main exponent was Joseph Priestley.3 As a matter of fact, he presents clearly 
what the ‘Doctrine of Necessity’ suggests in the case of human volitions and 
actions4 and in which way he interprets it. In his own words:
Correctly conceived, the doctrine called Philosophical Necessity 
is simply this: that, given the motives which are present to an 
individual’s mind, and given likewise the character and disposition 
of the individual, the manner in which he will act might be 
1 John Stuart Mill, A System of Logic: Ratiocinative and Inductive, in The Collected Works of 
John Stuart Mill, ed. J. M. Robson (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 1974) [hereinafter Mill, 
System of Logic].
2 Mill, as well as Herbert Spencer, was greatly influenced by the form of determinism expressed 
by the view of ‘Philosophical Necessity.’ The main advocator of ‘Philosophical Necessity’ was 
Joseph Priestley; see  Joseph Priestley, The Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity Illustrated; Being 
an Appendix to the Disquisitions Relating to Matter and Spirit. To Which is Added an Answer to 
the Letters on Materialism, and on Hartley’s Theory of the Mind (London: Printed for J. Johnson, 
1777). African Spir believed that after Priestley’s work, it was pointless to discuss the issue of 
free will further; see African Spir, Denken und Wirklichkeit. Versuch einer Erneuerung der kritischen 
Philosophie (Leipzig: J. G. Findel, 1873), 162.
3 For more information on Priestley’s ‘Doctrine of Philosophical Necessity’ see Clarke Garrett, “Joseph 
Priestley, the Millennium, and the French Revolution,” Journal of the History of Ideas 34, no. 1 (1973): 
51-66; also Isaac Kramnick, “Eighteenth-Century Science and Radical Social Theory: The Case of 
Joseph Priestley’s Scientific Liberalism,”  Journal of British Studies 25, no. 1 (1986): 1-30; Robert 
E. Schofield, The Enlightened Joseph Priestley: A Study of His Life and Work from 1773 to 1804 
(University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2004).
4 Arthur Schopenhauer wrote that “[…] no writer has presented the necessity of acts of will 
so thoroughly and convincingly as Priestley [...] If anyone is not convinced by this supremely 
clearly and accessibly written book, his understanding must really be paralysed by prejudices,” 
and that the work contributed to Kant who considered “the complete necessity of acts of will 
as a settled matter to which no further doubt could pertain.” Arthur Schopenhauer, On the 
Freedom of the Will (Trondheim: Royal Norwegian Society of Sciences, 1839), respectively 
77, 81.
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unerringly inferred; that if we knew the person thoroughly, and 
knew all the inducements which are acting upon him, we could 
foretell his conduct with as much certainty as we can predict any 
physical event. This proposition I take to be a mere interpretation 
of universal experience, a statement in words of what every one 
is internally convinced of.5 
Although, this seems to be a very well structured and fortified statement, as 
it seems to be referring to all possible factors that can be influencing human 
volition, we cannot ignore the fact that it seems very general and vague 
and thus a number of objections can be raised against it. Mill concentrates 
on three critical internal factors of the agent: the motives, the character 
and the disposition, and he summarizes all the external factors to one: 
all the inducements that can possibly act upon the agent. He implies that 
if potentially we knew all these factors, they would be enough to predict 
exactly the volition or the action of the agent. In fact, this statement seems 
vague since Mill does not make clear what other exact elements he considers 
to be included in the motives, character and disposition of the agent. 6
The first question that can be directly raised is how can we actually 
attain this kind of knowledge. Mill defends his position by making clear that 
he does not support that we can actually possess this knowledge but rather 
he supports that if we could possibly have it, we could definitely produce 
such predictions successfully. That is, given the knowledge of the relevant 
preconditions and laws, it is necessary that a person acts in a certain way, and 
a fully informed observer could predict precisely this person’s will and action. 
In other words, ceteris paribus, what a fully informed observer predicts about 
the person’s will and action, cannot but necessarily happen. 
Even then, however, if we are to accept this hypothesis, another, even 
more critical, question can be raised: Is this knowledge adequate? Are 
these factors enough to predict human volition and action? Even if we had 
the ability to approach this kind of knowledge, that is to say to know all 
5 Mill, System of Logic, 836.
6 In regard to motives, which play such a crucial role on the determination of will in Mill 
consider Norman Wilde’s argument referring to Kant’s notion of Good Will: “Motives, so far as 
they are internal, a supposed free will or autonomous self, cannot be subjected to observation 
and experiment, and hence must be ignored in considering the principles of moral judgment. 
The name of Kant, on the other hand, has always been connected with a system the exact 
opposite of the one just described. The celebrated opening of the Grundlegung has always 
been accepted as the keynote of his moral theory. ‘Nothing can possibly be conceived in the 
world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a Good Will.’ 
Here we have the direct contrary of the utilitarian position that the will has no value save in 
relation to the effects produced by it.” Norman Wilde, “Kant’s Relation to Utilitarianism,” The 
Philosophical Review 3, no. 3 (1894): 292. 
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these factors, would it be enough for us to predict exactly what a person 
would will and how she would act? 
In fact, in this paper I argue that if we were to know the motives, the 
character, the disposition and all the possible inducements that can act 
upon a person, we might be able to predict all kinds of her volitions and 
actions, except one, which we can definitely never predict: the will and/
or act that nobody ever before has imagined, thought, formulated and/
or done. This said, although Mill’s definition seems complete, he does not 
take into account the element of genuine creativity. By the element of and/
or capacity for genuine creativity I refer to the creative process of a will or 
action of a person that occurs for the first time, in the sense that it is, even 
in the slightest degree, historically and psychologically novel, unique and 
original. 
Mill implies that the aforementioned factors, i.e. the motives, the 
character, the disposition and all the possible inducements, are enough to 
predict all kind of volitions and actions of a person. Mill’s aspiration to provide 
a solution to the problem of compatibility between determinism and free will 
is based on what he refers to as a misleading association to the notion of 
necessity. Here we need to clarify the difference between the idea that actions 
occur necessarily and the idea that actions are predetermined and agents have 
no influence on them. Given this distinction, the doctrine of necessity, which 
for Mill is compatible with determinism,7 is differentiated from the doctrine 
of fatalism,8 which is not compatible with determinism. However, even by 
taking into account these remarks, the crucial question remains: How can 
one predict a will or an action that has never occurred before? How can you 
predict something that you cannot even imagine? Thus, Mill’s aforementioned 
factors seem to be inadequate, that is to say they are neither sufficient nor 
necessary for predicting human will and action, because they cannot predict 
the spontaneous outcomes of genuinely creative processes when they occur 
for the first time both in one’s personal and in collective history. Nevertheless, 
after the first time that such a volition or action takes place, it is added in the 
map of possible options of choices and the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity 
may possibly apply upon it too. 
7 Notice that Mill’s solution to the Problem of Necessity (i.e. the problem of determinism and 
freedom of the will), is one of the first compatibilist conceptions of free will. For more on this, 
see Elijah Millgram, “John Stuart Mill, Determinism, and the Problem of Induction,” Australasian 
Journal of Philosophy 87, no. 2 (2009): 183-199; George Boolos, “On Second-Order Logic,” The 
Journal of Philosophy 72, no. 16 (1975): 509-527; Janice Carlisle, John Stuart Mill and the Writing 
of Character (Athens, GA: University of Georgia Press, 1991).
8 For more information on Fatalism, see Alfred Jules Ayer, “Fatalism,” in The Concept of a Person 
and Other Essays (London: McMillan, 1963), 235-268; also Richard Taylor, “Fatalism,” The 
Philosophical Review 71, no. 1 (1962): 56-66.
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Perhaps we could understand better this claim if we considered an example 
from art. Let us imagine the first painter who ever drew truly abstractly, e.g. 
one of the pioneers of abstract expressionism. Making the hypothesis that 
people of her/his time knew completely everything about her/his life, motives 
and disposition and all the inducements acting upon her/him, they could have 
predicted what kind of paintings she/he would have intended to draw and 
in which way, but they could never have predicted that she/he would drew 
abstractly, outside of any already known forms and techniques. Let us here 
underline the fact that this kind of genuine creativity can be noticed not only 
in individual persons but also in collective movements etc. 
It might also be useful to think of the case of Medea.9 Let us assume, in a 
rather simplified way, that firstly, Medea's context was a historically existing 
one, and secondly, that no mother before Medea had ever reached the state 
of killing her children in order to revenge her husband. One could predict that 
when a wife feels cheated, she might want to take revenge and this revenge 
might be extreme, but before Medea no person could assume that a wife 
could possibly murder her children for revenge. In other words, I believe that 
there are many cases of different kinds of human volitions and actions (from 
aesthetically pleasing to morally repulsive), which even if we possess the 
knowledge of all relevant factors, both internal and external, which influence 
them, we are not able to predict them (e.g. something that happens for the 
first time in the known history of humankind and is, in such a way or degree, 
unique that no other person could have acknowledgingly ever imagined it). 
Moreover, one cannot but wonder if Mill took also into account cases of 
volitions and actions of mentally disordered persons. In cases of severe mental 
disorders nobody can predict what the person will or is able to do, even if we 
possessed all the knowledge that Mill suggests that is needed to do so. More 
precisely, the motives, the character and the disposition of a person together 
with all the inducements that can act upon her are not enough in order to 
predict the volition or an act of a seriously disordered mind. To begin with, 
a disordered mind does not work through a coherent causal system that we 
may be able to identify, like it has been mainly suggested for the human mind 
in general (although there are a number of lines of thought that argue against 
this supposition). But even if we supported that a disordered mind does work 
based on coherent causal laws too, we should accept that it does so based on 
much less obvious causal systems than other minds do. The key point here is 
that a disordered mind may have the ability to operate through novel ways of 
thinking and acting, and, while seeming irrational to other minds, to have the 
capacity for an alternative form of genuine creativity. Therefore, despite the 
9 Medea was the wife of Jason and mother of Mermeros and Pheres. When Jason betrayed her 
(he left her for Glauce, Creon’s daughter), she killed her children in order to revenge him. 
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amount of knowledge that one may possess for mentally disordered persons, 
one remains unable to predict the outcomes of at least a certain number of 
them that retain, at least, an alternative capacity for genuine creativity. 
Nevertheless, a Necessitarian could argue that by expanding these 
factors or deepen our knowledge on them, we could be able at some point 
to predict all cases of both mentally healthy and mentally disordered minds. 
But then we are once again faced with the paradox stated above. How can 
you make a prediction10 about something that you do not know yet that 
exists, i.e. it is not a part of any known conceptual space11 (such as the case 
of a genuine creative volition or act formulated through a creative process 
of an either mentally healthy or a mentally disordered person)? How can you 
predict something that you have never acknowledged, experienced or noticed 
before and never had a clue about it? If you cannot even imagine something, 
then certainly you cannot predict it. Could any infectious disease specialist 
ever predict or speak of a potentially pandemic virus that has never occured 
before? Could she recognize it or even conceive its existence? 
Therefore, in the case of either a healthy mind or a disordered mind that 
can give birth to volitions and actions based on factors which other human 
minds cannot even imagine, nothing can be predicted. However, let us keep 
in mind that such volitions and acts cannot be predicted solely for the first 
time that they occur. Their key element is the combination of originality, 
uniqueness and singularity of their nature. They manage to operate in a way 
that no mind has ever acknowledgingly operated before. They create a novel 
way of willing and a novel way of acting. Even if neuroscience, through its 
astonishingly promising paths, manages to read the human brain in its whole 
and understand in total the ways in which it operates, there will always exist 
a potentiality of a human being with a certain – biological or not – brain 
‘distortion,’ that will lead to the formation of a volition or an action that 
could not by any means be predicted. This kind of distortion is one of the 
cases that confound the element of prediction as Mill and the Necessitarians 
conceive it, i.e. a conception in which free will is not substantially free, since 
which capacity or attitude can be truly free when it can be predicted based on 
the very factors that formulated it. Spontaneity is a substantial element of 
freedom, and one that requires some form of creativity. Genuine creativity, 
10 For a thorough argumentation on the subject of predictability and its relation to determinism, 
see Daniel J. O’Connor, “Determinism and Predictability,” British Journal for the Philosophy of 
Science 7, no. 28 (1957): 310-315; Peter Herbst, “Freedom and Prediction,” Mind 66, no. 
261 (1957): 1-27; Haskell Fain, “Prediction and Constraint,” Mind 67, no. 267 (1958): 366-
378.
11 For further clarification on the concept of the conceptual space, see Margaret Boden, 
The Creative Mind: Myths and Mechanisms (London: Routledge, 2004); also Dimensions of 
Creativity, ed. Margert Boden (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1994). 
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thus, especially because its outcomes cannot be predicted, is the key element 
for both the existence and unpredictability of freedom of the will.
When Mill argues that, “We are exactly as capable of making our own 
character, if we will, as others are of making it for us,”12 Mill clearly believes 
that if we desire to change ourselves then we have the ability to do so, i.e. 
experience shows that we can affect our habits and attitudes and that this 
desire resides in our selves.13 Leaving aside for now, how deeply problematic 
may be to speak of an existing self14 as a robust, coherent entity,15 the 
aforementioned view of Mill operates as the substance of his doctrine of free 
will:
[…] that what is really inspiring and ennobling in the doctrine 
of free will, is the conviction that we have real power over the 
formation of our own character; that our will, by influencing 
some of our circumstances, can modify our future habits or 
capabilities of willing. All this was entirely consistent with the 
doctrine of circumstances, or rather, was that doctrine itself, 
properly understood.16 
For Mill, therefore, we are free in the sense that we can become those 
who we want to be, although any fully informed bystander not only could 
know what we would desire to become, but also, more importantly, what 
12 John Stuart Mill, The Collected Works of John Stuart Mill, ed. John M. Robson (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 1963-1991), vol. 8, 841 [hereinafter Mill, Collected Works].
13 Ibid. 
14 For more thoughts on Mill’s idea of the self, see Wendy Donner, The Liberal Self. John Stuart 
Mill’s Moral and Political Philosophy (Ithaca & London: Cornell University Press, 1991); Fred 
R. Berger, Happiness, Justice, and Freedom: The Moral and Political Philosophy of John Stuart 
Mill (Berkeley & Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1984); John Skorupski, Why Read 
Mill Today? (London & New York: Routledge, 2006); James O. Urmson, “The Interpretation 
of the Moral Philosophy of J. S. Mill,”  The Philosophical Quarterly  3, no. 10  (1953): 33-
39; Samuel Clark, “Love, Poetry, and the Good Life: Mill’s Autobiography and Perfectionist 
Ethics,” Inquiry 53, no. 6 (2010): 565-578.
15 According to another line of thought, not without several problems itself too, which has been 
espoused, from different directions, by empiricists, neuroscientists, feminists and post-modern 
thinkers, the self is constantly changing and incoherent and, in general, can be considered 
an illusion. For more, see Daniel C. Dennett, “The Self as a Center of Narrative Gravity,” in 
Self and Consciousness: Multiple Perspectives, eds. F. Kessel, P. Cole, and D. Johnson, 103-
115 (Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum, 1992); Daniel C. Dennett, Maxwell Bennett, Peter Hacker, and 
John Searle, Neuroscience and Philosophy: Brain, Mind, and Language (New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2007); Marilyn A. Friedman, “Autonomy and the Split-Level Self,”  The 
Southern Journal of Philosophy 24, no. 1 (1986): 19-35; Bruce Hood, The Self Illusion: Why 
There Is no ‘You’ Inside Your Head (London: Constable, 2012); Diana T. Meyers (ed.), Feminists 
Rethink the Self (Boulder: Westview Press, 1997).
16 Mill, Collected Works, 1, 177.
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we are going to become. He claims that: “I dispute therefore altogether 
that we are conscious of being able to act in opposition to the strongest 
present desire or aversion.”17 Hence, since one cannot counteract one’s 
much effective desire, one cannot but be necessarily determined by it, 
and thus the outcome of this determination can be fully and accurately 
predicted. In a comparison with Kant’s thought,18 Norman Wilde claims 
that:
If the desire for happiness were to be admitted as the principle 
for the determination of the will, no necessary law could be 
formulated; since pleasurable consciousness is the result of 
experience, from no examination of which could any necessary 
law be derived. In other words, the principle would be 
Heteronomy instead of Autonomy, which alone gives a basis for 
distinctly moral judgment. To allow a material principle such as 
pleasure to determine the will would be to place the Ego under 
natural laws in which no freedom is possible – and if no freedom, 
then for Kant, no morality is possible, since “the ratio essendi of 
the moral law is freedom,” i.e., self legislation.19
Consequently, Mill asserts that the fact that others can predict the volition or 
an action of an agent does not mean that the agent does not have free will; 
17 Mill, Collected Works, 9, 453.
18 However, it is important to keep in mind here that, in general, Mill looks into morality as 
a social practice and not as autonomous self-determination by reason, like Kant. For further 
argumentation on this, see Rocer Hancock, “Ethics and History in Kant and Mill,”  Ethics 
68 (1957): 56-60;  Roderick Ninian Smart, “Negative Utilitarianism,”  Mind  67,  no. 268 
(1958): 542-543;  John Jamieson Carswell  Smart, and Bernard Williams, An Outline of 
a System of Utilitarian Ethics (Cambridge:  Cambridge,  1973);  Jan  Narveson, Morality and 
Utility (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins Press, 1967).
19 Norman Wilde, “Kant’s Relation to Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical Review 3, no. 3 (1894): 
289-304, 292-293. In addition, of interesting relevance is Dennis A. Rohatyn’s claim that: “In 
view of these doctrinal affiliations, it is surprising to find Mill attacking Kant’s conception of 
free will and moral autonomy elsewhere (see [5], Ch. 26, esp. 298-299). Here Mill suggests 
that the Kantian conception is at odds with Mill’s own ideas on the formation of character, 
or ‘Ethology,’ a topic which Mill adumbrated at various times, and discussed embryonically 
in his System of Logic (Bk. VI, Ch. v, para. 4). Mill’s own resolution of the free-will question 
in the face of his idealized social science of man is itself muddled, hinging as it does on a 
vexed distinction between external (physical) and internal (agent’s own volition) causality. 
But this confusion surfaces in Kant’s third antinomy, as well, where it is made to accord with 
the idea of the will legislating maxims for itself (see [4], A444/B472, and also [3], 421). So 
even Mill’s criticisms of Kant turn out to be based on theories with which Kant would agree, or 
toward which the latter was moving.” Dennis A. Rohatyn, “Mill, Kant, and Negative Utility,” 
Philosophia 5 (1975): 517.
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contrariwise the agent remains free to will whatever she prefers.20 What I am 
trying to highlight here is that, in my opinion, the notion of genuine creativity 
to which I am referring, is a capacity of the human mind that operates before, 
and in a deeper level than, the formulation of one’s desires. The very source 
of the elements of freedom and unpredictability of the will resides in the 
capacity for creative processes, which in turn can create creative desires, and 
not in plain desires of the person as it has been suggested. 
Besides this, however, if other people can possibly predict, and thus 
know, in which ways one is going to act, then potentially one is able to 
know it too (either by being provided with this knowledge by others, or 
by using the same factors that the others used to make the prediction). 
Hence, if you know exactly how you are going to act – even if you can 
act in whichever way you want – you are not free, but constrained by 
the factors that are supposed to form your will. In addition to this, you 
also lose the freedom of changing your mind at the last moment. Thus, 
we are faced with a paradox here. Whilst Mill supports the existence of 
free will, he supports also the doctrine of the Philosophical Necessity on 
human actions, which based on the above arguments restricts the free will 
of the agent. However, those who desire to object this view may argue 
that even a last moment change of mind can be predicted if we know all 
the previously mentioned factors. But is it not restrictive to accept the fact 
that individuals are capable of thinking and acting only in the ways and on 
the options, which these specific factors can give birth to (even if these 
ways and options are abundant) and, thus, to exclude the possibility of not 
only creating a genuine will or action but also creating a genuine way and/
or option of willing and acting to begin with? 
Furthermore, if for a moment we assume that the agent may know all 
the factors that influence her will or action, then she can possibly change her 
will, after the prediction is formulated, in a way that cannot be predicted. If 
we take this idea one step further, we can support that not only an agent can 
alter her will, but also she can alter the factors that influence her volition and 
her actions. For instance, if an individual knows the factors that are used in 
order for her actions to be predicted according to Mill, then she can possibly 
alter them in way which resides out of the possible predictions map. In other 
words, she can barricade her will from the factors that influence it and base 
her actions on innovative factors. This might have as a result the cancelation 
of the validity of the possible predictions. 
Aristotle wrote, “Nor is there any definite cause for an accident, but 
only chance (τυχόν), namely an indefinite (ἀόριστον, aoriston) cause.”21 
20 Mill, Collected Works, 9, 548.
21 Aristotle, Metaphysics: Book V, trans. Hugh Tredennick, and G. Cyril Armstrong (Cambridge, 
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Following from this, we may conceive the volitions or actions which occur for 
the first time as nor outcomes of causal laws neither of chance, but rather as 
an outcome of an aoriston (indefinite/indetermined) cause, which immediately 
after they occur become orismenoi (definite/determined).22 Given this, I do 
not intend to suggest that the element of chance or luck is the reason why 
not all human actions can be predicted. The outcomes of genuine creativity 
should not, by any means, be understood as occurring from an element of 
chance or luck alone. Besides, we may here consider the concept of moral 
luck23 as proposed by Bernard Williams24 and further developed by Thomas 
Nagel25 in their renowned pair of articles, based on Kant’s idea of the Good 
Will in the Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals,26 claiming that our 
everyday judgments and practices commit us to the existence of it. However, 
a number of thinkers in the free will debate have argued against the existence 
of causal moral luck, while proposing a distinctive metaphysical account of 
human agency.27 This view is known as the “Agent-Causal Libertarianism” and 
the core idea is that the actions, or at least the formation of intentions, are 
caused by the persons themselves, without the persons being caused to do so. 
MA: Harvard University Press, 1935), 1025a25.
22 For thoughts on Mill’s relation to Aristotle on this topic, see Martha C. Nussbaum, “Mill 
between Aristotle & Bentham,” Daedalus 133, no. 2 (2004): 60-68.
23 Thomas Nagel defines moral luck as follows: “Where a significant aspect of what someone 
does depends on factors beyond his control, yet we continue to treat him in that respect as an 
object of moral judgment, it can be called moral luck.” Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (New 
York: Cambridge University Press, 1979), 59. 
24  Bernard Williams, Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981);  Bernard Williams, 
“Postscript,” in Moral Luck, ed. D. Statman, 251-258 (Albany: State University of New York 
Press, 1993).
25 Thomas Nagel, Mortal Questions (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1979); Thomas 
Nagel, The View from Nowhere (New York: Oxford University Press, 1986).
26 Immunity from luck has been thought by many to be part of the very essence of morality 
and it has found its inspiration in Kant: “A good will is not good because of what it effects 
or accomplishes, because of its fitness to attain some proposed end, but only because of 
its volition, that is, it is good in itself […] Even if, by a special disfavor of fortune or by the 
niggardly provision of a step motherly nature, this will should wholly lack the capacity to carry 
out its purpose – if with its greatest efforts it should yet achieve nothing and only the good 
will were left (not, of course, as a mere wish but as the summoning of all means insofar as they 
are in our control) – then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has its 
full worth in itself. Usefulness or fruitlessness can neither add anything to this worth nor take 
anything away from it.” Immanuel Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, ed. and 
trans. Mary J. Gregor (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 4: 394.
27 See Roderick Chisolm, “Human Freedom and the Self,”  The Lindley Lecture, University 
of Kansas (1964);  Randolph Clarke, “Toward a Credible Agent-Causal Account of Free 
Will,” Noûs 27 (1993): 191-203; Richard Taylor, Action and Purpose (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1966); Timothy O’Connor, Persons and Causes: The Metaphysics of Free Will 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2000).
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Thus, an agent, while exercising her own causal powers, is an undetermined 
cause of her own intentions. This said, in my opinion, the source of one’s causal 
powers that ensures the freedom and unpredictability of one’s intentions, 
volitions and actions, by rendering one the undetermined cause of them, is the 
capacity for genuine creativity. 
Following from the above, I am of the opinion that a will or act which 
take place for the first time may occur both through intentional rational 
reflection and/or through imaginativeness28 of the agent and still without 
being able to be predicted, since the agent, at least in cases of genuine 
creativity, operates for sure as the undetermined cause of them. On the 
relationship of rationality, freedom and causal relationship let us think here 
Kant’s main argument in the GMS that regarding oneself as rational implies 
regarding oneself as free.29 However, whether through Kant’s thought we can 
succeed in showing that firstly, regarding oneself as free is incompatible with 
accepting universal causal determinism and secondly, regarding oneself as 
rational is incompatible with accepting universal causal determinism, remain 
open questions for further investigation.30
This said, I accept that the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity might be true 
for a majority of human volitions and actions except those of authentic, genuine 
creativity, which, by definition, occur for the first time, i.e. they are characterized 
28 For a historical review and discussion of the notion of imaginativeness, see James Eric Grant, 
The Critical Imagination (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013). 
29 For thorough argumentation on this, see Corina Mieth, and Jacob Rosenthal, “‘Freedom must 
be Presupposed as a Property of the Will of All Rational Beings’ (GMS III, 2),” in Immanuel 
Kant, Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals, eds. Cristoph Horn, and Deiter Schoenecker, 
247-284 (Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 2006); Richard Mervyn Hare, Freedom and Reason 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963); Allen Wood, Kantian Ethics (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2007); Alvin I. Goldman, “The Compatibility of Mechanism and Purpose,” The 
Philosophical Review  78, no. 4 (1969): 468-482;  William Hasker, “The Transcendental 
Refutation of Determinism,” The Southern Journal of Philosophy 11, no. 3 (1973): 175-183.
30 For now, however, Wilde’s suggestion operates in an illuminating manner: “To say that man 
is to act from a principle which he can will to be universal law – to make him the supreme law-
giver to himself, is to place him above the reach of all law other than his own, or that which 
he freely makes his own. If, then, as a rational being he cannot be subject to anything without 
him, he is an end unto himself – an absolute end so far as rational. All men, moreover, as 
partakers of a common reason, must also be regarded as ends, and so treated, i.e., the ends of 
each individual must be made the ends of the particular subject. Thus from the idea of law Kant 
passes to its equivalent, the idea of the self, since the form of law is but the expression of the 
nature of the rational self. The term ‘law’ in this connection rather confuses the real identity 
of these two notions, since it is generally used in Kantian ethics to denote a command. But 
it is thus used in relation to the lower self as constrained, and not of the higher or noumenal 
self as the source of law. In regard to this latter, it denotes merely natural law, habit, or 
nature. The moral law, as issued to the self as object in the form of command, is really the 
expression of true nature of the rational self as subject. It is only as imposed upon the self 
regarded as inclination, that it takes the form of command.” Norman Wilde, “Kant’s Relation 
to Utilitarianism,” The Philosophical Review 3, no. 3 (1894): 296.
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by historical and psychological novelty. The element of indeterminate surprise of 
genuine creativity here is more than crucial. This direction places the core argument 
of this paper on the thin line between compatibilism31 and libertarianism. More 
specifically, I certainly support the existence of free will and action (as, in general, 
Mill does too), but I disagree on the fact that it can always be predicted, and thus 
I argue for the existence of a more substantially free form of volition. I support 
the idea that incidents of reality can be considered as determined (orismenoi), but 
only after these incidents have occurred before at least once. More precisely, a 
will or action that is formulated through one’s capacity for genuine creativity is 
considered indetermined (aoriston) until it takes place for the first time, when it 
immediately becomes determined (orismeni) for all the following times that will 
occur. 
In this paper I attempted to suggest that there are cases of human will 
and action that cannot be predicted even if we possessed all the knowledge 
that Mill and others believed to be adequate, i.e. both sufficient and necessary, 
in order to do so. An exemplified case on which this paper was based is the 
formation of volitions or actions, which occur for the first time ever, through 
the capacity for genuine creativity. I maintained that in this case, Mill’s doctrine 
of Philosophical Necessity cannot apply, and that the human mind, through 
its creative processes, has potentially the capacity to formulate a free will or 
action that, no matter what kind of knowledge we possess, cannot be predicted. 
I argued, thus, against Mill’s attempt of conjunction of the freedom of the will 
and the doctrine of Philosophical Necessity, while I claimed that a will cannot 
be free and be predicted at the same time, as both the elements of freedom and 
unpredictability of the will are founded on the very process of its formulation 
as an outcome of genuine creativity. 
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